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WHO ARE WE TRYING TO PROTECT? 
THE ROLE OF VULNERABILITY 
ANALYSIS IN NEW ZEALAND'S LAW 
OF NEGLIGENCE 
Scott William Hugh Fletcher* 
New Zealand has incorporated ideas of vulnerability within its law of negligence for some years. It 
has not, however, clarified what is meant by vulnerability or the role the concept plays within the 
broader duty of care framework. Several obiter comments in Body Corporate No 207624 v North 
Shore City Council (Spencer on Byron) suggest the concept ought not to be part of the law due to its 
uncertain and confusing nature. Subsequent cases have, however, continued to use the concept, and 
continue to use it despite both its historically ill-defined nature and the additional uncertainty added 
by Spencer on Byron. This article argues that vulnerability can and ought to be a part of New Zealand 
negligence law. With a consistent application of a single test for vulnerability – that established in 
the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd – vulnerability 
can be conceptually certain and provide useful insight into the issues posed by the law of negligence. 
I INTRODUCTION 
"[V]ulnerability is a poorly understood concept".1 It can refer to a wide range of ideas and play a 
part in a wide variety of legal arenas. In Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council 
(Spencer on Byron), three judges of the Supreme Court made obiter suggestions that vulnerability 
should have a limited role to play in New Zealand negligence law.2 Despite these observations, the 
concept was extensively used in the recent case of Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Minister of Education 
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(Carter Holt (CA)) and in such a way that the decision effectively turned on the application of the 
concept.3 This leaves the law of negligence in a regrettable state of flux and, given that "issues of 
vulnerability are apt to be problematic", clarification of the role of vulnerability in negligence law is 
needed.4  
This article argues that, contrary to the suggestions in Spencer on Byron, vulnerability can be a 
concept that is "capable of reasonably clear and consistent administration".5 To that end, it suggests 
the courts adopt the test for vulnerability taken by the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street 
Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (Woolcock): that the court assess vulnerability based on whether 
the plaintiff had reasonable alternative means to protect themselves.6 Through simple and consistent 
adoption of that test, many of the issues that confuse vulnerability can be addressed, and it is suggested 
that this provides a clear focus for an analysis of vulnerability. 
The article has three substantive parts. Part II discusses the Carter Holt case, summarising how 
the concept of vulnerability was used within the Court's approach to the duty of care issue. This 
provides an introduction to the concept, highlighting several of its analytical strengths and 
weaknesses. Part III expands upon the meaning of vulnerability, discussing how the concept is used 
in a variety of situations before settling on the Australian test from Woolcock. It will be seen that 
vulnerability is used in a variety of different ways by different sources, and that it is necessary to have 
one single approach within the law of negligence to achieve conceptual clarity. Finally Part IV 
discusses how the Woolcock test can fit within the broader law of negligence, suggesting ways in 
which it works alongside other areas within the duty of care analysis. Several criticisms of 
vulnerability are addressed, and it is suggested that there is a tendency to overstate the extent to which 
the concept is confusing. 
II THE CARTER HOLT CASE 
A The Judgment 
The Carter Holt decision appears to be the first case to feature an analysis of vulnerability after 
the observations in Spencer on Byron. This summary focuses on the negligence cause of action, and 
especially on the reliance on an analysis of vulnerability within that cause of action. Vulnerability was 
  
3  Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Minister of Education [2015] NZCA 321, (2015) 14 TCLR 106 [Carter Holt (CA)]. 
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s judgment: Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v 
Minister of Education [2015] NZSC 182. 
4  Spencer on Byron, above n 2, at [38] per Tipping J. 
5  North Shore City Council v Body Corporate 188529 [2010] NZSC 158, [2011] 2 NZLR 289 as cited in 
Spencer on Byron, above n 2, at [156] per Chambers and McGrath JJ. 
6  Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16, (2004) 216 CLR 515 [Woolcock] at [23] 
per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 
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heavily utilised in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, but its application to the facts of the 
case was not well reasoned.7 
The plaintiffs were the Minister of Education and the Boards of various Schools around the 
country which owned or administered leaky buildings. They sued various manufacturers who had 
provided sheet cladding systems for the buildings, alleging the materials were inherently defective. 
Carter Holt was the only defendant not to settle the claims against it, and applied to have the claims 
struck out.  
The plaintiffs claimed Carter Holt owed them a duty of care in negligence to "design, manufacture 
and supply cladding sheets for use on the school buildings that complied with Recognised Building 
Standards, the Building Code requirements and the Building Acts".8 The sheets at issue were called 
Shadowclad, a form of plywood cladding used in the construction of the school buildings. The 
plaintiffs claimed that Shadowclad allowed unacceptable levels of moisture ingress into the building, 
resulting in structural damage, rot and a loss of value in the plaintiffs' properties. The case has 
conceptual similarities with other "leaky building" cases that have been before the courts for some 15 
years, with concerns about occupant health and the structural integrity of the plaintiffs' buildings a 
major part of the claimed loss.9 
In response Carter Holt argued that it could not owe the plaintiffs a duty of care. It was not in a 
sufficiently proximate relationship with the plaintiffs, both because of the way "building work" was 
defined in relevant legislation and because of the contractual nexus between the parties.10 The 
plaintiffs also sued under the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, the tort of negligent misstatement, an 
allegation of a negligent failure to warn and the Fair Trading Act 1986. In the High Court, Carter Holt 
failed to strike out any of the plaintiffs' causes of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeal struck out 
the negligent misstatement claim, but all other claims were allowed to proceed to trial. This summary 
does not further consider these causes of action and, similarly, limitation defences pleaded by Carter 
Holt are not considered. 
The Court of Appeal held it was arguable that Carter Holt owed the plaintiffs a duty of care in 
negligence. It applied the two-step framework from South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New 
Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd (South Pacific), assessing whether the parties were 
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in a proximate relationship such that it was foreseeable that Carter Holt's allegedly negligent conduct 
could cause the plaintiffs loss, and then whether policy factors negated that prima facie duty of care.11  
Foreseeability of loss was clearly established on the facts as pleaded by the plaintiffs.12 As its 
manufacturer, Carter Holt could reasonably have foreseen Shadowclad being used in buildings and 
that, if it leaked, the buildings could suffer damage. The question of proximity between the parties 
was more finely balanced. The Court considered three key arguments: whether the Building Acts and 
Building Code supported the alleged duty, whether the contractual matrix surrounding the parties' 
relationship told against the existence of the alleged duty, and whether the plaintiffs were vulnerable. 
The latter two points are the focus of this part and they illustrate important ideas about the place of 
vulnerability in New Zealand law.  
Neither the relevant statutory framework nor the relevant contractual matrix prevented the 
recognition of the claimed duty of care. The statutory framework of the Building Acts and Building 
Code regulated "building work", but building work (at the time the plaintiffs' buildings were 
constructed) did not include the manufacturing of components like Shadowclad. The Court did not 
view this silence as decisive, suggesting the factual relationship between the parties was the overriding 
concern.13 Similarly, the contractual matrix did not necessarily prevent the Court recognising the 
claimed duty of care.14 The Court referred to several cases discussing the effect of contractual 
relationships on the existence of tortious duties of care, including the leading case of Rolls-Royce New 
Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd (Rolls Royce).15 The contractual matrix at issue in this case 
was "readily distinguishable" from that featured in Rolls Royce, being "diffuse and decentralised", 
and the limited facts before the Court suggested different policy issues to those salient in that case.16 
Suggestions raised by Carter Holt that the plaintiffs could have contractually allocated risk, and the 
possibility of their doing so, were better left to trial when all the evidence was before the Court.17  
Further, the existence of the claimed duty was supported by the vulnerability of the plaintiffs. 
Regrettably the analysis as to the vulnerability of the plaintiffs diverges between the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal, despite the Court of Appeal endorsing the approach taken by the High Court.18 
  
11  South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 
282 (CA) [South Pacific] at 305 per Richardson J. 
12  Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [42]–[43]. 
13  At [68]. 
14  At [52]. 
15  Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 324 (CA) [Rolls Royce]. 
16  Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [56]–[58]. 
17  At [60]. 
18  At [74]. 
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In the High Court, Asher J cited the Woolcock case and stated three different ways in which the 
plaintiffs were vulnerable vis-à-vis the defendants, two of which are clear applications of the 
Woolcock test.19 The Court of Appeal, however, stated that the Woolcock test was not good law in 
New Zealand and refused to consider notions of contractual self-protection as relevant to the 
vulnerability analysis, whilst stating no ways in which the plaintiffs were vulnerable in its own 
judgment.20 The unfortunate contradictions between these two judgments are discussed at length 
below. Both judgments agreed that the plaintiffs were vulnerable however, and that overall the claim 
could proceed to trial despite being "finely balanced" on the proximity point.21 
The Court of Appeal further considered that the policy factors at play in the case were not 
sufficient to negate the resulting prima facie duty of care.22 Relevant policy factors included that the 
moisture ingress affecting the buildings in turn affected occupants' health, which weighed in favour 
of a duty of care.23 There was also some suggestion that manufacturers in the position of Carter Holt 
would bear an unfair proportion of responsibility for leaky buildings, but that was balanced by the 
public benefits obtained from promoting "the careful development and testing of products, and 
accurate marketing as to their qualities".24 Considerations of commercial certainty may have further 
weighed against a duty of care, but the Court preferred those to be left to trial where evidence could 
establish the exact extent of their relevance.25 Finally, the duty argued for would not conflict with 
other areas of law and might in fact be supported by various public law duties acting upon the 
parties.26 
On that basis, the Court was not prepared to strike out the claim alleged by the plaintiffs in 
negligence. The importance of the vulnerability analysis cannot be overstated; it is the only positive 
factor at the proximity stage supporting the claimed duty of care. It is unfortunate then that the analysis 
on the vulnerability point is so conflicted, and it is suggested that the judgment cannot be properly 
understood without a careful examination of that analysis. 
  
19  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [46]. 
20  Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [74]. 
21  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [49]; and Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [76]. 
22  Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [100]. 
23  At [96]. 
24  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [59]. 
25  Carter Holt (CA), above n 3, at [80]. 
26  At [98]. 
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B Critiquing the Vulnerability Analysis 
In the High Court, there were three points affecting the plaintiffs' vulnerability: first, that the 
plaintiffs could not detect the latent defects that caused them loss; secondly, that the degree of 
separation between the parties and the multiplicity of components suggested the plaintiffs could not 
be expected to take steps to protect themselves; and thirdly, that the plaintiffs may have had the ability 
to take steps to obtain contractual warranties or insurance.27  
The first point suggests that a party cannot be expected to protect itself if it does not know it needs 
to do so. As the defects in Shadowclad were not likely to have been apparent, the plaintiffs could not 
have hired experts to investigate the building for defects as they would not have known they needed 
to do so.28 In this respect, the observation in Woolcock that there was no suggestion in that case the 
alleged defects "could not have been discovered"29 strongly indicates that the Judge was utilising the 
test from that case. A party is potentially not vulnerable if it is at least capable of discovering a loss 
because it is able to potentially know of the need to take steps to protect against it; conversely, a party 
who is incapable of discovering a loss cannot know of that need.  
The second and third points relate to the opportunities afforded to the plaintiffs in contract. The 
third point acknowledges the potential ability of the plaintiffs to obtain contractual warranties, the 
exact analysis rejected by the Court of Appeal. The second point reflects earlier observations by the 
Judge within the contractual matrix section of the analysis that there was no evidence as to the extent 
"warranties were obtained commonly by owners in the industry in this context, or whether indeed it 
would have been at all practical to insist on such warranties".30 As with the first point above, this 
analysis appears to relate to observations in Woolcock as to how vulnerability applied to the facts of 
that case. The plaintiff in Woolcock was a subsequent purchaser of a warehouse, and the original 
owner had not obtained contractual warranties from the builder or assigned his rights against third 
parties involved in the construction of the warehouse to the subsequent purchaser.31 The majority 
stated that on those facts the plaintiff could have availed himself of protection in contract, but did not, 
and accordingly was not vulnerable.32 If that logic is applied to the facts of this case, it is suggested 
that Asher J's emphasis on the lack of evidence as to the practicality of obtaining similar contractual 
  
27  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [46]. 
28  At [46]. 
29  Woolcock, above n 6, at [23] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 
30  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [41]. 
31  Woolcock, above n 6, at [31] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 
32  At [31]. 
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protections reflects concerns that arguably the plaintiffs in this case could not have taken steps to 
protect themselves in contract.33  
If that is accepted, then the second and third points are in essence simply a single factor addressing 
the viability of contractual protections. In the High Court, the absence of evidence protected the claim 
from strike out because the judge could not be sure whether the means of contractual self-protection 
were reasonable in the circumstances (and by extension whether the plaintiffs were vulnerable). If 
Carter Holt could lead evidence suggesting the costs of obtaining contractual warranties were low, or 
that insurance was reasonably available, the Court would not have considered the plaintiffs to be 
vulnerable at trial. In that sense then, the High Court was concerned by the practical possibility of the 
plaintiffs obtaining means to protect themselves. An obvious means of obtaining such protection is 
through the law of contract, and it is for this reason that the High Court judgment frames issues of 
vulnerability alongside analysis of the contractual matrix at issue in the case. 
The implicit relationship between the contractual matrix analysis and the vulnerability analysis 
just described is an important one, and its significance is discussed at some length in Part IV. For 
present purposes however it must be emphasised that the Court of Appeal's rejection of Woolcock 
vulnerability is illogical and renders the judgment critically flawed. Indeed, if its rejection of the 
Woolcock test is correct, there would be no reason to consider the plaintiffs vulnerable as the analysis 
at first instance was dependent on that test. By extension, since the vulnerability analysis was the only 
positive factor supporting a finding of proximity, the Court of Appeal must have been in error in not 
striking out the claimed duty of care. The Court cited no authority for its suggestion that contractual 
self-protection was not a part of an analysis of vulnerability, other than the points of obiter from 
Spencer on Byron mentioned above (comments which reject vulnerability analysis).34 Further, the 
analysis that the Court rejected – ascertaining the reasonableness of contractual warranties – is 
undertaken by the same Court earlier in its judgment as part of its analysis as to the contractual matrix 
existing between the parties.35 Finally, the Court of Appeal's own statement of the test in the High 
Court, whether the plaintiffs "could have been expected to know of, and take steps to protect itself 
against, the risks in shadowclad" is exactly the same approach as in Woolcock, for it focuses on the 
self-protective means available for the loss at issue.36 It is thus difficult to understand on what basis 
the Court of Appeal took the view it did. 
An analysis of vulnerability played a major part in the Carter Holt decision. It is suggested that 
the High Court's approach to vulnerability is correct and allows for a logically consistent and 
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36  At [74]. 
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conceptually clear judgment. Neither Court examined the reasons for the plaintiffs' vulnerability in 
detail. Nonetheless, the idea of "practical" self-protection that found favour in the High Court (and to 
an extent in the Court of Appeal) is a helpful introduction to the concept. 
III UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITY 
A Vulnerability Generally 
The High Court has suggested a test for vulnerability in the negligence context: that set down by 
the High Court of Australia in Woolcock. To understand why such a specific test for vulnerability is 
necessary, it is helpful to explore what the concept means generally and how it has been used by the 
courts. This part first seeks to suggest why vulnerability risks being conceptually confusing, 
identifying the source of the problems raised by Spencer on Byron. It then discusses how New Zealand 
case law has defined vulnerability in the negligence context, noting an unfortunate tendency to 
complicate the concept. Finally, it discusses what the test for vulnerability ought to be in New Zealand, 
seeking to resolve that confusion by critiquing some of the various approaches suggested in the cases. 
A person may or may not be vulnerable depending on the context. This is well illustrated by the 
recent decision of Seales v Attorney-General.37 In that case, the plaintiff sought declarations allowing 
her to end her own life and protecting her doctor from criminal liability if her doctor assisted her to 
do so. Significant argument focused on the potential vulnerability of persons seeking euthanasia, and 
the evidence led by the Attorney-General noted a vast range of differing circumstances where 
someone could be considered vulnerable, including medical, ethical and social circumstances. In 
keeping with that broad approach to vulnerability, Fineman suggests that a notion of vulnerability 
might be a basis for an alternative ethical foundation for our political system, discussing the extent to 
which humans are universally vulnerable vis-à-vis each other.38 In a narrower fashion, vulnerability 
has been said to be the "golden thread" that underpins such diverse areas of law as breach of fiduciary 
duty, undue influence, unconscionability and negligent misrepresentation.39 Similarly, Stapleton 
suggests significant aspects of the law of negligence – such as reliance and reasonable foreseeability 
– can be explained using notions of vulnerability,40 an argument that attracted judicial support in 
Woolcock.41 
  
37  Seales v Attorney-General, above n 1, at [77]. 
38  Martha Albertson Fineman "Equality, Autonomy and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics" in Martha 
Albertson Fineman and Anna Grear (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law 
and Politics (Ashgate, Surrey, 2013) 13 at 13. 
39  Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC) at [25]. 
40  Jane Stapleton "Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused 'Middle Theory'" (2002) 50 
UCLA L Rev 531 at 558–559. 
41  Woolcock, above n 6, at [24] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. 
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Any or all of the different approaches to vulnerability may be correct within their different 
contexts. For current purposes though, what these arguments illustrate is the breadth of ways in which 
vulnerability can be used. If vulnerability is to be used by the courts in the duty of care analysis, there 
needs to be a clear test that ensures conceptual clarity and avoids the uncertainty that attaches to such 
a broad concept. As Todd puts it, "[f]or a principle of vulnerability to work properly, we need to be 
able to point to a category of claim where plaintiffs can be treated as vulnerable".42 If claimants are 
unsure when they are vulnerable in the sense used by a case, unacceptable uncertainty results. 
B Vulnerability in New Zealand Case Law 
It follows from that conclusion that, if vulnerability has caused conceptual confusion in the past, 
it is likely because the courts have not adopted a straightforward approach to the concept. In New 
Zealand, several leading judgments have discussed notions of vulnerability, but their usage of the 
concept is unfortunately inconsistent. The logical place to begin a discussion of vulnerability in 
negligence is the well-known distinction between residential and commercial building owners that 
existed pre-Spencer on Byron. In two cases the Court of Appeal stated commercial owners of 
buildings could not sue for damage to their buildings caused by negligent building work because they 
"cannot be characterised as 'vulnerable' in the same way as house-owners".43 In Te Mata Properties 
Ltd v Hastings District Council (Te Mata) Baragwanath J suggested that the distinction was due to 
the "public interest in secure habitation" and "presumed economic vulnerability".44 He considered 
that, given the claim for a defective building was primarily one of economic loss, it ought to be 
confined to situations where there was a risk to individual health and where the plaintiff was resident 
in the dwelling. 
As the majority in Spencer on Byron pointed out, however, that analysis is based on assumptions 
about the position of commercial and residential owners that cannot be correct.45 There are many 
conceivable situations where a commercial owner could be in a worse economic position than a 
residential owner, and the health justification can easily and conceivably apply to premises used 
commercially.46 It similarly cannot be assumed that commercial owners can always protect their own 
interests, for in some circumstances there may be structural market reasons why forms of self-
  
42  Stephen Todd "Policy Issues in Defective Property Cases" in Erika Chamberlain, Jason Neyers and Stephen 
Pitel (eds) Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart, Oxford, 2007) 199 at 228 (emphasis in original). 
43  Queenstown Lakes District Council v Charterhall Trustees Ltd [2009] NZCA 374, [2009] 3 NZLR 786 at 
[39]; and Te Mata Properties Ltd v Hastings District Council [2008] NZCA 446, [2009] 1 NZLR 460 [Te 
Mata]. 
44  Te Mata, above n 43, at [62] and [57]. 
45  Spencer on Byron, above n 2, at [197] per Chambers and McGrath JJ. 
46  At [169] per Chambers and McGrath JJ. 
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protection (insurance for example) are not available, a point recognised in the High Court judgment 
of the Carter Holt case.47  
For an analysis of vulnerability to work, the position of the allegedly vulnerable party must be 
examined in detail and against a clear comparator. With respect, it cannot be conducive to effective 
reasoning for a court to rest a duty of care on a presumption of a plaintiff's circumstances. Each case 
"should be decided on its merits".48 The approach used by Baragwanath J relied on arguable 
interpretations of various statutes and lacked analysis of the plaintiff's means or opportunities, and 
such an approach unsurprisingly led to uncertainty.  On a simpler level, the distinction drawn by the 
Court of Appeal was prone to significant conceptual difficulties at the margins, with cases involving 
short-term accommodation and school buildings both causing later courts difficulty. Indeed, Todd 
suggests that this lack of conceptual clarity is a primary reason why the Court in Spencer on Byron 
rejected the distinction.49 If vulnerability analysis is to be undertaken by the courts, it needs to have 
a greater degree of conceptual clarity than the analysis in Te Mata. 
It is perhaps understandable then why the Court in Spencer on Byron cast doubt on the use of 
vulnerability in negligence law. However, there are other judgments of high authority that use the 
concept in more helpful ways. In South Pacific a fire had destroyed the buildings of an insured party 
in two separate claims before the Court.50 In one claim, the insured alleged that the investigator had 
negligently conveyed to the insurer that the insured were responsible for the fire, and as a result the 
insurer had refused to indemnify the insured for their loss. Though the claim failed, Hardie Boys J 
noted:51 
The factor most strongly favouring recognition of a duty of care in the present case is what might be called 
the vulnerability of the insured … the insured is unlikely to call in an investigator of his own, certainly 
not until it is probably too late. 
Richardson J similarly commented that the plaintiffs had "no obvious means of protecting 
themselves against the risk of carelessness on [the investigator's] part in other aspects of the 
investigation and reporting" and that "a plaintiff who has had the opportunity … [in] contract to obtain 
  
47  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [47]. 
48  Rosemary Tobin "Leaky Buildings and the Local Authority: The Tortious Solution and the Hamlin 
Conundrum" (2011) 17 NZBLQ 346 at 361. 
49  Stephen Todd and others The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) at 
165. 
50  South Pacific, above n 11. 
51  At 317–318 per Hardie Boys J. 
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full contractual protection against this kind of loss cannot expect society to provide further protection 
through tort law".52  
In essence, the judgments analyse the capacity of plaintiffs to protect themselves from the loss, 
which is the same approach utilised by Asher J in the Carter Holt case.  
The decision in Rolls Royce goes further and expressly states a test for vulnerability.53 In that 
case, the plaintiff, Carter Holt, entered into a contract with the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
(ECNZ) for the construction of a generator. ECNZ subcontracted with Rolls Royce, but Carter Holt 
chose not to contract with Rolls Royce itself. Glazebrook J held that "[t]he strongest factor pointing 
away from a proximity finding is the very contractual structure that made loss to Carter Holt 
foreseeable".54 Carter Holt had the opportunity to protect itself in contract, but had chosen not to, and 
was a "sophisticated commercial part[y]" which had made that decision freely.55 It is suggested that 
a finding that a party is "sophisticated" and "commercial" is inherently finding they are not vulnerable, 
and the Judge notes vulnerability is a "key factor" in the duty of care analysis.56 Two tests for 
vulnerability are mentioned: whether a defendant with special skills has power over a vulnerable 
plaintiff, and whether there were reasonable alternative means of protection available to the plaintiff.57  
The latter category is the same as that used in Woolcock, and that judgment is cited in support of 
the test. It is not entirely clear from the first category of vulnerability however what factors will make 
the plaintiff vulnerable such that the defendant's special skills are relevant (or alternatively whether it 
is the defendant's special skills that make the plaintiff vulnerable). With respect, it is not helpful to 
state a test that requires a court already know the plaintiff is vulnerable. If the test is not to create 
confusion, it must operate in a way that ensures analytically sound results. 
The final leading authority is Minister of Education v Econicorp Holdings Ltd (Econicorp).58 In 
that case, the appellant was the owner of several school buildings affected by moisture ingress, 
allegedly due to negligent construction by the respondent. The School's Board of Trustees was party 
to the contract with the defendant, but the Minister was not, as this reflected the Government's policy 
on the Minister's relationship with school boards. The majority refused to strike out the Minister's 
claim in tort despite acknowledging both that the Minister was not vulnerable and that the contractual 
  
52  At 307 and 309 per Richardson J. 
53  Rolls Royce, above n 15. 
54  At [103]. 
55  At [104]. 
56  At [61] citing Woolcock, above n 6. 
57  At [61]–[62]. 
58  Minister of Education v Econicorp Holdings Ltd [2011] NZCA 450, [2012] 1 NZLR 36 [Econicorp]. 
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nexus told against the imposition of a duty of care. The Minister was a "sophisticated, well-resourced 
party" who had made a deliberate decision not to contract with the defendant (reflecting Government 
policy) and the contract itself had provisions that suggested the Board had itself obtained the kind of 
contractual protections the Minister could have chosen to obtain.59 The majority nonetheless 
considered that the situation was "not a truly commercial" one, and that the public law relationship 
between the Minister and the Board suggested there were other reasons for the Minister not 
contracting with the defendant.60  
With respect, a plaintiff's subjective reasons for not availing themselves of self-protection ought 
to be irrelevant.61 Whether under the guise of vulnerability or other areas of duty analysis, a court 
ought not to recognise a duty of care where a plaintiff deliberately chose to forgo "full protection" 
outside of negligence.62 Further, the concept of vulnerability is likely to be significantly complicated 
by the addition of such subjective elements into a court's analysis, requiring as they do additional 
evidence and creating further uncertainty within otherwise well-defined relationships. 
C The Appropriate Test for Vulnerability 
Following these decisions then, there is some doubt both as to the existence of a test for 
vulnerability in negligence law and what form that test might take. It is suggested that New Zealand 
law ought to adopt the Woolcock test without any of the additional complicating factors noted above 
– essentially the way it was utilised in the High Court judgment of the Carter Holt case. To repeat, 
that test asks whether there were reasonable opportunities available to the plaintiff for self-protection 
from harm caused by the defendant's want of reasonable care.63 The aim of the concept is to allow 
negligence to fill holes in areas where pre-existing legal protections are insufficient, for if such 
protections already exist plaintiffs will have had a reasonable opportunity to protect themselves.64 
This is a straightforward and clear concept well utilised in Australian jurisprudence, and it is 
conceptually clear once complicating factors from some of the New Zealand cases are removed. 
Absent from that test are the complicating factors identified in the cases discussed above. The 
insistence on a deliberate examination of the opportunities available to the plaintiff precludes a 
presumption of vulnerability. The difficulties with making such a presumption are numerous. First, 
as the Te Mata distinction illustrated, there are likely to be examples of cases that rebut the 
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Rev 135 at 142. 
 THE ROLE OF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS IN NEW ZEALAND'S LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 31 
presumption and which render the rule conceptually unsound. Secondly, the duty of care analysis is 
usually intensely fact-specific and necessarily relies strongly on the evidence before the court.65 A 
presumption is not a substitution for evidence, and presumptions are likely to obscure and confuse the 
evidence that forms a part of that analysis. Further, since vulnerability is linked to broader concerns 
around market structures, the court ought to have a sound evidential basis before making a decision 
that affects the range of stakeholders represented by those concerns.66 Finally, a full range of evidence 
is needed to properly understand the opportunities reasonably available to the plaintiff, and it is likely 
this reason why the Court in Carter Holt refused to strike out the claimed duty of care.67 In Australia, 
clear evidence is needed before a finding of vulnerability is made.68 There is no reason New Zealand 
should differ, and a presumption of vulnerability contradicts the needs and purposes of the duty of 
care. 
These considerations also suggest the first type of vulnerability in Rolls Royce ought not to be 
used.69 As noted, on the face of it, it is not clear how a plaintiff is deemed "vulnerable" such that the 
defendant's special skills become relevant. It may be that the plaintiff is vulnerable because of the 
defendant's special skills, but if that is so then the claim could just as easily be made under the 
Woolcock test – it would be unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to be aware of opportunities for self-
protection that relied on specialist skills or knowledge the plaintiff lacked.70 Beyond being 
analytically unnecessary, such an approach also utilises ideas of reliance that are more properly part 
of the law of negligent misstatement.71 Perhaps the first test could revolve around particular 
circumstances of the plaintiff, in a way that is conceptually similar to the equitable doctrines of 
unconscionable bargain or undue influence. If so, it risks making any resulting duty of care 
unworkably fact-specific "and impossible to administer" because it risks drawing too much on the 
specific circumstances of the case before the court.72  
To be sure, there are some situations where a given plaintiff's vulnerability is obvious. In child 
abuse cases, for example, the plaintiff's vulnerability cannot be doubted.73 However, forcing such 
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cases to go through an analytical framework is crucial if any resulting duty of care is to demonstrate 
the category of claims to which it applies rather than leaving doubts about the boundaries of the duty. 
Further, the danger of not doing so is that it essentially rests the duty on intuitive ideas about the 
plaintiff. In the child abuse example, no person would doubt (intuitively or analytically) that the 
plaintiff deserves protection. In other cases however reasonable people may differ as to whether a 
particular plaintiff is intuitively vulnerable, and indeed intuitions of vulnerability may not reflect the 
deeper reality of the situation. It is, for example, difficult to conceive of the Crown as a vulnerable 
entity. Yet the Minister of Education was a plaintiff in the Carter Holt case, and that decision rejects 
any intuition of vulnerability in favour of a more nuanced consideration of the particular opportunities 
and market structures at play in that case.74 
Similarly, the addition of subjectivity into an analysis of vulnerability adds further uncertainty to 
the inquiry. A plaintiff's subjective reasons for not utilising self-protective measures may be relevant 
insomuch as they support a judicial finding that, on the evidence, the plaintiff made a deliberate 
decision not to exercise the options available to them. Such a finding was made in Rolls Royce75 and 
a similar approach has been utilised in Australian applications of the Woolcock test.76  
However, to allow a plaintiff's subjective reasons to affect the legal analysis cuts across the 
certainty that is a key part of commercial relationships and the law of contract (by which many 
opportunities for self-protection are governed).77 A party ought to be able to assume it owes no 
liability to another party who, knowing it is at risk of injury by actions of the potential injurer and 
being able to protect itself from those risks, chooses not to do so. Indeed, this is even more so in 
situations where the party chooses to contract but does not do so on terms that provide that 
protection.78 It is an unfair burden to expect the potential injurer to ascertain why the knowing party 
chooses not to do so, and in some circumstances it may not be possible for the potential injurer to 
discharge that burden. In many instances the practical effect of this is that the ability of the plaintiff 
to obtain insurance becomes relevant. The relationship between insurance and vulnerability analysis 
is complex, and it may be that there are additional issues that affect vulnerability analysis when 
insurance becomes relevant.79 Such issues are outside the scope of this article. In any event, the 
addition of subjectivity to the analysis only increases any complexity these issues might have. 
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IV PLACING VULNERABILITY WITHIN THE BROADER LAW 
OF NEGLIGENCE 
A Vulnerability as Part of the Duty of Care Framework 
It has been argued that the Australian test of vulnerability established in Woolcock ought to 
represent the law in New Zealand. This part builds on the foundations of the Woolcock test to explain 
how an analysis of vulnerability should function within the broader New Zealand approach to novel 
duties of care. If the test can be conceptually clarified as previously stated, and clearly placed within 
the existing framework for assessing novel duties of care, it cannot be considered "unworkable" as 
was suggested in Spencer on Byron. The part begins by placing vulnerability within the two-stage 
framework long favoured by the New Zealand courts. It then discusses how it intersects with concerns 
about the "tort–contract" matrix and the relevance of statutes to the delineation of a vulnerable class 
of claimant. 
Vulnerability has been treated by all of the New Zealand authorities previously referred to as a 
relevant factor to the proximity stage of establishing a novel duty of care. The Australian courts that 
developed the Woolcock test however have rejected the usage of proximity within their duty of care 
analysis, instead choosing to take a different approach whereby vulnerability is a "salient feature" in 
cases featuring pure economic loss.80 The approach to questions of novel duties of care is a flexible 
and evaluative one, with ideas of proximity and policy guiding rather than binding a court.81 It might 
therefore appear unnecessary to consider the role played by vulnerability in the two-stage test, given 
that different approaches ought to permit of the same outcome.82 The Australian approach to 
vulnerability however links it strongly to notions of pure economic loss, perhaps even making it a 
requirement for liability in such cases.83  
In New Zealand notions of pure economic loss do not attract the same level of concern.84 Since 
the New Zealand approach is a flexible one, it appears inconsistent for the courts to treat vulnerability 
as either limited to cases of economic loss or to make it a prerequisite of a finding of a duty in such 
cases. Rather, a finding of vulnerability should be simply one factor the court considers in its overall 
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judgement of whether to recognise the claimed duty.85 Similarly, and despite the observations noted 
above, an analysis of vulnerability ought not to be limited to situations where considerations of market 
structure and associated power imbalances are at play. The reasonable opportunities for a plaintiff to 
obtain protection can be relevant in many of the situations confronted by the law of negligence, and 
there is no reason to constrain the flexible New Zealand approach in this way either.86 
Vulnerability can be a part of that test however only if it is consistent with the way that broad test 
functions. Beever, responding to Stapleton's arguments cited above, argues that vulnerability "is 
inconsistent with the important role played by reasonable foreseeability in [the] law".87 A finding that 
the plaintiff is vulnerable, he argues, is more likely the less foreseeable the loss at issue was, and on 
that basis vulnerability cuts across the rest of the analysis undertaken at the proximity stage.  
Given that foreseeability of loss is a "screening mechanism" that any claim must pass through 
before it can be established, the alleged incompatibility appears irrelevant; if the loss was not 
foreseeable then no duty of care arises, no matter how vulnerable the plaintiff.88 Regardless, the 
argument proceeds on a misunderstanding of how vulnerability analysis functions. The question that 
an analysis of vulnerability asks is whether the plaintiff could take steps to protect themselves, not 
whether they would have. It is true that, if the loss was unforeseeable, the plaintiff might not have 
availed themselves of any self-protective measures, but what matters is whether those self-protective 
measures were reasonably available to the plaintiff. Indeed, if a plaintiff considered a loss was unlikely 
and decided it was not worth protecting themselves against, then that deliberative process is exactly 
that which a non-vulnerable plaintiff would exercise.89 The two concepts comfortably sit beside each 
other, and the Carter Holt case illustrates the distinction; it was reasonably foreseeable that negligent 
manufacture of Shadowclad would cause damage to the plaintiffs' buildings, but the vulnerability 
analysis centred on whether the plaintiffs could have protected themselves in contract or through 
insurance from that loss.90  
B The Relationship between Vulnerability and the Tort–Contract Matrix 
It is helpful then to discuss how an analysis of vulnerability functions alongside other aspects of 
the duty of care that are dealt with at the proximity stage. Since vulnerability often relates to 
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contractual opportunities afforded to a plaintiff, the tort–contract matrix often employed in the duty 
of care analysis is directly relevant. Rolls Royce is the leading New Zealand authority in this area, and 
following that case the courts assess the terms of any contract at issue to ascertain whether they limit 
or exclude liability in tort, including the possibility of terms not agreed to by the parties.91 Following 
the High Court approach from Carter Holt, the synergy between this analysis and vulnerability 
analysis is straightforward. Rolls Royce considers the theoretical ability of the plaintiff to seek 
contractual protection, and the vulnerability analysis considers the practical ability of the plaintiff to 
obtain that same protection, taking into account market realities and relative bargaining power.92 If 
the theoretical alternatives were reasonably available to the plaintiff, then they were not vulnerable 
and a duty is unlikely to arise. So much is consistent with the approach in Rolls Royce itself.93 
The role of vulnerability is not therefore limited to a consideration of impractical alternatives, but 
assesses how reasonable those alternatives were to parties in the position of the plaintiff.94 It was 
stated previously that any test for vulnerability cannot be determined on the basis of circumstances 
peculiar to the plaintiff; it would not be enough for a plaintiff in a given proceeding to rely on their 
own lack of means. Rather they would have to argue that people in their position bargaining with 
others in the defendant's shoes could not reasonably alter the terms of their relationship, even if self-
protection was theoretically possible. An example of such an argument would be where a standard 
form contract was imposed on people in the plaintiff's position.95  
Similarly, it might be enough for the plaintiffs in Carter Holt to show that, even if it was possible 
to insure against the kind of harm suffered in that case, such insurance would have required lengthy 
and costly negotiations or significant searching effort such that the means of self-protection was not 
reasonably available in the circumstances. It might be argued that allowing a reasonableness criterion 
into an assessment of commercial relationships undercuts the commercial certainty and respect for 
the free market that is a core part of the law. Yet, as Todd notes, vulnerability can be connected to the 
very concerns of economic efficiency which motivate that core part of the law.96 The point illustrated 
by the hypothetical arguments above is that, in some circumstances, the transaction costs of achieving 
self-protection through contract or insurance may be too prohibitive for parties to enter into those 
arrangements even if doing so might be efficient.  
  
91  Rolls Royce, above n 15, at [103]–[114]. 
92  Carter Holt (HC), above n 7, at [47]. 
93  Rolls Royce, above n 15, at [104]. 
94  Todd and others, above n 49, at 164–165. 
95  Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL) at 843 and 851 per Lord Templeman; and John Burrows, Jeremy 
Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) at 20. 
96  Todd and others, above n 49, at 164. 
36 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
It cannot be said then that the reasonableness criterion is a commercially unsound one. Further, it 
should be noted that commercial parties may also not reasonably be able to gain self-protection. It 
could be suggested that, following the analysis in Rolls Royce, a sophisticated commercial party is 
capable of protecting itself in contract, and that an analysis of vulnerability is unnecessary when 
dealing with such parties. It is doubtful that the case stands for that proposition, as that factor was 
only one of several mentioned in the judgment telling against the imposition of a duty of care.97  
In any event the Carter Holt case did not take that approach and it was right not to do so. A 
distinction needs to be drawn between being able to negotiate favourable terms in contractual 
negotiations, and being able to negotiate for the availability of a specific term or protection. The Court 
of Appeal recognised that, no matter how sophisticated the Minister, if a particular form of protection 
was not offered in New Zealand, then the Minister could be vulnerable.98 "Any underlying assumption 
that commercial parties are generically not vulnerable cannot be right."99 Just as the court ought not 
to make presumptions about a particular party's vulnerability, the court should not assume that a 
commercial party is able to negotiate a specific self-protective term simply by virtue of its resources 
and bargaining power. 
C Delineating a Class of Vulnerable Plaintiffs 
A further consideration often utilised by the courts is the extent to which any relevant statutes are 
consistent with the alleged duty. A duty is unlikely to exist where that duty would conflict with the 
policy in a given statute.100 If a statute draws a distinction between different classes of claims, 
however, it might be arguable that the distinction drawn reflects a belief by Parliament that one class 
was vulnerable. This approach is reflected in William Young J's dissent in Spencer on Byron, where 
the Judge emphasised the different treatment of residential owners from commercial owners in several 
statutes as reflecting an intention by Parliament to treat commercial and residential owners 
differently.101 It may also be that a statute confers duties and obligations on a particular class of 
defendant, and that within that regulatory framework some parties that interact with the regulated 
defendant are vulnerable whereas others are not.  
In Smith v Eric S Bush the House of Lords held that a valuer owed a duty of care in tort to 
purchasers who relied on the valuation they provided to a mortgagee of a property, and that the valuer 
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could not rely on an exclusion clause in the contract of valuation.102 The mortgagee was not 
vulnerable as they were able to bargain directly with the valuer as to the terms of their relationship, 
but a purchaser could not (and might also be of limited means), meaning the latter was vulnerable.103 
Since the English Parliament had intended to limit the availability of exemption clauses and provide 
for liability for valuers in some circumstances, it was consistent for the Court to recognise a duty 
owed to vulnerable purchasers.104 Just as Parliament might delineate a vulnerable class, it might also 
establish a protection regime wherein some classes of people required tortious protection. 
There is nothing of principle in that approach that can be objected to, but care must be taken during 
the statutory interpretation exercise. Since a class is only vulnerable due to the absence of effective 
pre-existing legal protections, if Parliament was not considering the availability of those protections 
when passing the relevant statute, it did not necessarily intend to treat the class as vulnerable. The 
statutory regime in Smith v Eric S Bush was specifically targeted at the ambit of liability for 
professional valuers, and evidence of Parliament's intent was readily available.105 That will not 
necessarily be true in all cases, however, and as vulnerability can be utilised in a variety of different 
ways, it cannot be assumed that a delineation of a class by Parliament necessarily reflects the approach 
to vulnerability the courts ought to be concerned with. It should also be remembered that Parliament 
may not have intended distinctions drawn between different classes to reflect considerations of 
liability. Responding to an argument from the defendant's counsel, Chambers and McGrath JJ in 
Spencer on Byron considered distinctions drawn by the Building Act were not intended to form the 
basis of the claimed distinction between residential and commercial buildings.106 The distinctions 
were not intended to form the basis of tortious liability, but rather were designed to tailor regulatory 
requirements to different types of building.  
Despite these challenges though, the focus on statutory criteria is helpful insomuch as it reflects a 
positive emphasis on the clear "line-drawing" necessary to ensure a principled and workable duty of 
care.107 If a statutory regime can provide a principled and workable distinction then the courts ought 
to utilise that distinction, but if not the use of comparator groups may be of some assistance. A 
comparator group is a mechanism frequently used in the human rights context to assist in cases of 
alleged discrimination.108 In this context, the exercise would involve comparing those within the 
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scope of the claimed duty of care and those outside it based on the alleged grounds of vulnerability 
(an ability to obtain insurance, for example). If the vulnerable class could protect itself in ways that 
the self-sufficient comparator could, then it would not be vulnerable, and if members of the vulnerable 
class could protect themselves then the claimed duty would be owed to an overly broad class.  
To illustrate this, it is helpful to consider the grounds upon which Asher J considered the plaintiffs 
in the Carter Holt case were arguably vulnerable.109 The first ground (latent nature of the defects), 
clearly justifies a finding of vulnerability. It is unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to prevent damage 
they cannot know is occurring, and such damage is different from damage that is detectable by a 
layperson and that which they can take steps to prevent or mitigate.110 The second and third grounds 
(reasonableness of contracting and availability of insurance) also support a finding of vulnerability. It 
is unreasonable for the plaintiffs to have to contract with a wide variety of different manufacturers of 
different and specific goods to protect themselves as compared to a party who had a direct relationship 
with a manufacturer or was dealing with a small number of potential contracts. Similarly, if there was 
no insurance available against the resulting loss to the plaintiffs, then they are clearly disadvantaged 
as against a comparator party who could insure against a claimed loss. 
It is true that comparator groups have been criticised strongly in the human rights context.111 
Those criticisms are less apposite within the negligence context however. Comparator groups affect 
the legal analysis in discrimination cases, but here the effect they have is helpful.112 The definition of 
the vulnerable class likely defines the scope of persons to whom a claimed duty of care is owed, and 
on that basis engaging in a clear comparator exercise ensures a workable and consistent duty of care 
is developed. Such concerns are less relevant in the human rights context because the class of 
claimants affected by a ruling is specified.113 Here too concerns about arbitrary and early dismissal 
of just claims are less relevant, as there are other areas within the duty of care analysis a claimant can 
succeed on.114 In fact, courts that engage in a thorough comparative analysis are unlikely to make the 
kind of problematic presumptions that dismissed just claims in Te Mata.115 It is true that such 
measures may not be necessary, but given the fundamental need to ensure clarity of analysis it is 
suggested they be adopted. 
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V CONCLUSION 
Given the utility and history of vulnerability in the law of negligence, it might be thought 
unfortunate that the comments in Spencer on Byron cast so much uncertainty on its usage. That 
uncertainty need not remain, however, because the approach taken by the High Court in the Carter 
Holt case is capable of responding to its critics. The approach to vulnerability in New Zealand ought 
to be a straightforward application of the Woolcock test, as Asher J undertook in that case. With 
respect, it is the addition of alternative tests or misapplications of that test that are the likely source of 
any conceptual confusion, a problem the Court of Appeal in the Carter Holt case contributed to. 
Clarity of the law is a laudable and crucial aim, but there is no reason to believe that the Woolcock 
test need be anything other than straightforward. Indeed, vulnerability is capable of sitting 
comfortably alongside major concepts associated with the duty of care and providing useful assistance 
to courts assessing the validity of a claimed novel duty. 
The strength of the New Zealand approach to negligence is its ability to take a holistic and flexible 
approach to the challenges presented by novel duties of care. This is necessary because of the wide 
variety of situations the law of negligence must confront. Yet if concepts like vulnerability are 
confused or excluded from the analysis, the court risks limiting the broad array of tools it needs to 
deal with the different challenges presented by the tort. So long as a concept is useful and clear, its 
potential to assist in a given claim means it should be left at the court's disposal. Vulnerability is 
capable of assisting courts to that end, and acknowledging that will ensure that the law of negligence 
provides clear and just results. 
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